are commitments to rules over standards, theoretical abstractions over messy realities, "surface appearance, 6 over what lies beneath, and uniformity over diversity.
At a high level of abstraction, Bush v Gore holds that standards must be reduced to rules. Several things are of note here. First, from the perspective of the history of ideas about law, this is a recurring proposition, at one extreme in the arc of a pendulum that has been swinging for centuries between the forms of action and the Chancellor's foot The most recent full arc of this pendulum on the Court extends from Bush v Gore back to the Burger Court's concern with irrebuttable presumptions. For a time in the early 1970s, across a wide spectrum of subjects from voting rights to sex and gender,' a Court majority took a position diametrically opposite to the Bush v Gore majority, repeatedly holding, in effect, that the Constitution required rules to be relaxed into standards. 0 Had the majority that decided Vlandis v Kline," or Cleveland Board of Education v La Fleur 2 been faced with the Florida election laws, they not only would have seen no difficulty with an "intent of the voter" standard, they would likely have found objectionable any attempt, through rigid and arguably overbroad uniform rules, to preclude an individualized assessment of voter intent. From the moment of his appointment to the Court, however, Justice Rehnquist set his face against his brethren's insistence on turning rules into standards. While his brethren saw dangerous arbitrariness in unbending rules, Rehnquist's vision of equal protection and due process focused on the dangers of individualized discretion. He was finally able to turn his dissenting views into a majority opinion in Weinberger v Salf, ' 3 the case that definitively swung the pendulum back in the direction of Court's previously revealed distaste for the messy disorder of democracy).
6 Laurence H. Tribe, eroG.v hsuB: Through the Looking Glass, in Bruce Ackerman, ed, Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy 39, 46 (Yale 2002) .
7 Longtime University of Chicago law professor Kenneth Culp Davis was one of those who tracked the pendulum as it swung, in his view, too far in the direction of discretion. See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice (Louisiana State 1971) .
8 See, for example, Carrington v Rash, 380 US 89,96 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a conclusive presumption that soldiers were not bona fide residents of the town in which they were stationed).
9 See, for example, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 658 (1972) (mandating individualized determination of a nonmarital father's fitness as a parent).
10 1 have discussed at length the relationship between this Burger Court tendency and the development of modem constitutional sex discrimination law in Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell L Rev 1447 ,1466 -69 (2000 .
11 412 US 441,452 (1973) (mandating an individualized assessment of an incoming student's intent to become a state resident).
12 414 US 632,643 (1974) (striking down uniform cutoff dates for pregnant teachers to leave the classroom).
13 422 US 749, 771-83 (1975) (upholding a bright-line rule for conferring survivor's benefits).
rules, a direction in which it kept swinging until the arc reached a peak in
Justice Scalia is perhaps most famous for his insistence on "the Rule of Law as a Law of Rules."'" But, given that Rehnquist for decades has argued that a "preference for 'individualized determination[]' is in the last analysis nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking,"" his willingness to join the Bush majority in insisting on "specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment" is, like Scalia's, consistent with at least some of his longstanding jurisprudential commitments. plicity" of "readily administrable rules" over justice in the individual case. 22 Before joining the Court, Breyer was "the guiding force"2 behind an enterprise whose vision of equality in the uniformity of rules has much in common with Bush v Gore's -the current incarnation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines./ Shortly before it held the Florida vote recount unconstitutional because it gave officials too much unfettered discretion, the Court did the same for the Chicago Gang Loitering Ordinance.' In their concurrences, both Justices O'Connor and Breyer stressed the constitutional difficulties with a law's failure to provide "sufficient minimal standards to guide law enforcement officers."", Both Justices O'Connor and Breyer had previously expressed great concern with the "arbitrary results" that can follow from an absence of "meaningful standards" to "constrain [ ] discretion" in the punitive damages context. 2 The belief that such standards could have
22
Acknowledging Atwater had suffered "pointless indignity and confinement" and "gratuitous humiliation," Souter admitted that "if we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail." Id at 321,346.
23
Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging 58 (Chicago 1998).
24
Both enterprises, starting with what seemed like arbitrary and unjustifiable variations in judging, focused on the need to eliminate apparent disparities and impose greater uniformity by rule, but were subject to the criticism that they sought to reduce to rigid formulae events not fairly capable of such mechanical reduction. Compare Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging 58,84 (cited in note 23):
By largely eliminating... the power of any individual to consider the circumstances of the crime and of the defendant in their entirety ... the Guidelines threaten to transform ... sentencing into a puppet theater in which defendants are not persons, but kinds of personsabstract entities to be defined by a chart, their concrete existence systematically ignored and thus nullified.
with Tribe, eroG.v hsuB: Through the Looking Glass at 44 (cited in note 6) (decrying the "illusion of a technical'fix'...
[by] justices who acted as though machine-like algorithms could workably replace human judgment"). In each case, it may be a question of picking your poison. Is it more disturbing when the appearance of disparate, even arbitrary, treatment covers the reality of more uniform treatment once all not immediately visible factors are taken into account, or alternatively, when an appearance of uniform treatment masks the reality of arbitrary, disparate treatment? 25 Of course, this sort of criminal ordinance is a much more usual site of worry over excess discretion. If I were to identify a single decisive moment in the oral argument of Bush v Gore, it would be the moment when Justice Kennedy, putative author of the per curiam opinion, asked David Boies "from the standpoint of [the] equal protection clause, could each county give their own interpretation to what intent means, so long as they are in good faith and with some reasonable basis finding intent? ... Could that vary from county to county?" ' Boies, the consummate practitioner, whose view is from the trenches, responded by acknowledging what for him is an obvious reality of his experience:
I think it can vary from individual to individual.... I think on the margin, on the margin,. . . whenever you are interpreting intent, whether it is in the criminal law, an administrative practice, whether it is in local government, whenever somebody is coming to government.... I think there are a lot of times in the law in which there can be those variations from jury to jury, from public official to public official. 29 If the tone of Boies's answer can be summarized by the colloquial, "Well, duh!", the tone of Kennedy's reaction harks back to an earlier catch phrase: "I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here." Unlike the cynical and corrupt French police officer in Casablanca with whom the line originated, however, Justice Kennedy actually sounded shocked. 0 "But here you have something objective," Kennedy insisted:
You are not just reading a person's mind. You are looking at a piece of paper, and the supreme courts in the states of South Dakota and America v Gore, 517 US 559, 587-88 (1996) (Breyer concurring, joined by O'Connor and Souter) ("Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice... helps to assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself... The standards the Alabama courts applied here are vague and open ended to the point where they risk arbitrary results."). 30 The line, of course, is from the movie Casablanca (Warner Brothers 1942), and the parallel to Bush v Gore can be extended. Like the Bush v Gore majority, the officer faced a scene of political disorder, with French and Germans, rather than Democrats and Republicans, competing noisily. Asked to shut down the scene by the numerically weaker but politically more powerful Germans, the officer originally demurs saying he "has no excuse to" do so. Told to "[find one," he complies, declaring, "This cafe is closed until further notice." When asked by the proprietor, "How can you close me up? On what grounds?" the officer responds with the line quoted in the text,just as a cafe employee hands him his winnings from the gambling table.
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[70:55 the other cases have told us that you will count this hanging by two corners or one corner, this is susceptible of a uniform standard, and yet you say it can vary from table to table within the same county." A cynical observer, who views the Court as no more naive than Casablanca's police, might claim that the precedent most directly relevant to Bush is the census enumeration case." The same majority that decided for Bush decided that case, also knowing that the decision it reached would advantage the Republican party over Democrats." The cases both involved a conflict over concepts of accuracy in tallying. Some have suggested that the political character of both decisions is evidenced by a reversal of arguments by all sides in the two cases." But I actually see the approach of the majority as consistent in the two cases-in each case it opted for the superficial appearance of precision -after all, what can be less manipulable, less fuzzy than "actual enumeration" or more precise and accurate than a machine recount? Yet imprecision lurked beneath the surface in both cases. Included in the count the Court accepted was data that suffered from exactly the same problems as that rejected in both the 
Department of Commerce v House of Representatives, 525 US 316,335-43 (1999) (interpret-
ing the statute at issue to prohibit statistical sampling for use in calculating the population for apportionment purposes).
33 This is because it is predictably more likely to be voters in Democratic groups, such as "renters, residents of large cities, and racial minorities," Nathaniel Persily, Book Review, The Right to Be Counted, 53 Stan L Rev 1077, 1081 (2001), who are most susceptible to undercount in an enumeration but to inclusion through statistical sampling. Note that, as with the continued counting of votes under a broad standard of voter intent in Florida, the advantage to Democrats and corresponding loss to Republicans can only be the subject of an educated guess, not a certainty, at the time the Court decides. And, in both cases, the effect of the Court's decision is to cut off a full comparison of the workings of the two methods. Note also that in both cases those less likely to be counted are more likely to be poor, racial minorities, or immigrants.
34 See id at 1077 (seeing both cases as "pitting humans against machines" and claiming that "consistency of argument ... took a back seat to the logic needed to win" with "[t]hose who argued against a manual recount of ballots usually demand[ing] that only manual methods" be used for the census and vice versa). But see Tushnet, 90 Georgetown L J at 117 (cited in note 16) (noting the similarity of lineup but claiming the two cases "clearly raised legal questions that had nothing whatever to do with each other").
35 Fortunately, the census could provide what Florida could not -a remedy for the worst of the undercounting: "Republican lawmakers sought to counter the charge that their opposition to adjustment reflected their resignation to the differential undercount and an inaccurate census ... Republicans adopted a 'roll up your sleeves' approach,' which translated into an additional billion dollars ... to make the headcount more accurate." Persily, 53 Stan L Rev at 1097 (cited in note 33).
36 Consider, for example, the Rehnquist concurrence's assertion that there is "no basis for reading the Florida statutes as requiring the counting of improperly marked ballots" Bush, 531 US at 120. Even assuming, arguendo, that were true, this shouldn't solve the majority's equal protection problem, but rather further complicate it. It is clear that at least some improperly marked ballots were included in the existing tally. Remember the many imperfectly marked absentee ballots counted for Bush? Combining the majority's rigid "treat like ballots alike" model with the Rehnquist view of voter error, the reviewing court, instead of searching for yet more valid ballots among the imperfectly marked, would need to undertake the perhaps equally massive task of throwing out all those ballots A non-cynical observer, assuming Justice Kennedy was indeed sincere in his shock, might see even more frightening implications. Among these are, as Linda Greenhouse has observed, that on the Rehnquist Court, "something vital has been lost-a framework for seeing the world in all its gritty reality from inside the marble cocoon."" There are several related dangers to this cocooned perspective. The first is simply the apparent lack of awareness of just how thoroughly, in the words of Justice Ginsburg's Bush dissent, "we live an imperfect world." 39 As Boies, together with Ginsburg and Stevens (the only two Justices not to find equal protection problems with the Florida recount), realized all too clearly, there were, indeed "a lot of times in the law in which there can be those variations. ' To hold each such variation an equal protection violation would beparalyzing; to focus on the relatively trivial deviations in counting standards and ignore much larger disparities is, as the Bush dissenters point out, to worsen inequality under the guise of curing it."
The second danger is the Court's susceptibility to the illusion that by intervening it can achieve greater perfection. In the case of Bush v Gore, examining this illusion begins with the empirical question of whether the standard of voter intent can fruitfully be reduced to uniform rules. The majority finds that "the formulation of uniform rules ... is practicable."" Well, yes, it almost always is, 43 but practicable does not mean fair, or, in that, though defective, were counted anyway. The fact that the Rehnquist concurrence does not demand this resonates with its joiners' view of merit in affirmative action cases-anyone who managed to slip through already, regardless of whether he actually punched his ticket correctly, is by virtue of little more than that alone, innocent, meritorious, and worthy of protection. Anyone who hasn't is out of luck, even if the reason is, for example, inferior resources in poor neighborhoods. See Spencer Overton, A Place at the Id at 106 (majority). 43 For example, "off with their heads," is a rule, but not one well suited to the demands of the Constitution. That the arbitrariness of uniform rules has dangers equal and opposite to the arbitrariness of individualized discretion became clear in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence as it oscillated from fears of standardless discretion in Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972) to fears in later cases, such as Locket v Ohio, 438 US 586 (1978) , of rules too rigid to allow all appropriate mitigating factors to be taken into account. 44 As Richard Friedman (a specialist, it should be noted, in the law of evidence) put it in Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 Fla St U L Rev at 828 (cited in note 26):
Certainly uniform rules could be developed, but they would not necessarily be very good rules for determining a voter's intent .... Any simple rule by definition will exclude relevant information from the inquiry and so inevitably lead to inaccurate determinations. Any complex rule will inevitably lead to variations in application, even if one entity makes all the decisions; ask any- [70:55 anything but the most formalistic sense, 5 offering the equal protection of the law to persons." ' Nevertheless, a willingness to, as Pam Karlan puts it, "achiev[e] esthetic regularity at significant cost', 4 7 may be another hallmark of the Rehnquist Court.
Karlan, 79 NC L Rev at 1353 (cited in note 5). A concern for the surface appearance of regularity is not quite the same as a commitment to rules, despite some overlap. Although they are generally less insistent on rules than some of their brethren, appearances seem to matter most to Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, the Justices most closely associated with the Bush v Gore per curiam equal protection holding. Particularly in both her Establishment Clause and her reapportionment jurisprudence, O'Connor has repeatedly and explicitly insisted that "perceptions" and "appearances do matter." See, for example, Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630,647 (1993) . For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the Religion Clauses, 2000 S Ct Rev 325, 354. Justice Kennedy's concern for the constitutional dimensions of appearances comes through, for example, in his dissent in Stenberg v Carhart, the partial birth abortion case, where he stresses the state's interest, even in cases where some form of abortion will in any event take place, in banning a form of abortion that, because of its "stronger resemblance to infanticide ... presents a greater risk of disrespect for life." 530 US 914,963 (2000) . uniformity" and since it frequently these days "orders a [nationiwide [remedy] with minimal procedural safeguards," is every failure to grant certiorari now a potential equal protection violation, at least where fundamental rights are at stake? Is a conflict in the circuits now unconstitutional? What assurance have we that "the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied" in that vast bulk of Rehnquist Court cases in which a court majority shows itself unwilling or unable to articulate standards that bind its discretion or that of lower courts?
As an example of the application of impermissible arbitrariness, the Bush majority cites a Dade monitor who testified to having "observed that three members of the county canvassing board applied different standards in defining a legal vote." 2 But the three members of the board each examined all disputed ballots and voted on them," so, assuming, as the majority appears to, that the board's votes were cast in good faith, the fact that each member applied his or her own standard does not mean that the results over a range of ballots were at all arbitrary or inconsistent. In the days of Redrupping," the nine members of the Court did far worse. Each of them applied his own standard of obscenity in viewing a film, and voted, without bothering to articulate reasons. What was at stake was not the validity of a ballot, but the constitutionality of a prison termsometimes up to twenty years. But, like a ballot, an allegedly obscene film or photo is "scratches on an inanimate object, a piece of... paper .... The factfinder confronts a thing, not a person."" In the days of Redrupping, the Court was not "confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment.' 6 Is it today, given the multitude of cases in which, judging by the proliferation of concurrences, "members of the [Court] appl[y] different standards in defining" the law? 7 Just as with the irrebuttable presumption cases, so with Bush v Gore, to take the holding seriously "would turn the doctrine ... into a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth 
